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Democratising Food: The Case for a Deliberative Approach 
 
Abstract  
 
Prevailing political and ethical approaches which have been used to both critique and 
propose alternatives to the existing food system are lacking. Although food security, 
food sovereignty, food justice and food democracy all offer something important to our 
reflection on the global food system, none is adequate as an alternative to the status quo. 
This paper analyses each in order to identify the pre-requisites for such an alternative 
approach to food governance. These include a focus on goods like nutrition and health, 
equitable distribution, supporting livelihoods, environmental sustainability, and social 
justice. However, other goods, like the interests of nonhuman animals, are not presently 
represented. Moreover, incorporating all of them is incredibly demanding, and some are 
in tension. This raises the question of how each can be appropriately accommodated and 
balanced. The paper proposes that this ought to be done through deliberative democratic 
processes which incorporate the interests of all relevant parties at the local, national, 
regional and global levels. In other words, the paper calls for a deliberative approach to 
the democratisation of food. It also proposes that one promising potential for 
incorporating the interests of all affected parties and addressing power imbalances lies 
in organising the scope and remit of deliberation around food type. 
 
Introduction  
 
There is broad consensus that the contemporary food system produces outcomes which 
are detrimental to human nutrition, producer and worker livelihoods, environmental 
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sustainability and animal welfare. The current organisation of the global food system is 
dominated by market-centric productivism, underpinned by liberal economic thinking, 
and increasingly driven by corporate agrifood. This has been propelled by the state-led 
expansion of large-scale industrial agriculture, the liberalisation of agricultural trade, 
the financialisation of food, and the increasing involvement of multi-national food 
corporations in all aspects of the food chain.1 Since the 1970s, several approaches  and 
counter approaches  have developed which attempt to either reform or radically alter 
the status quo.2 The most prevalent has been the concept of food security which arose 
in the 1970s in response to rising food and oil prices. Although it has a range of 
permutations, its key focus on access to food has meant that it does not always 
adequately attend to where food comes from and how it is produced. Consequently, 
since the 1990s, three additional discourses, which are more normative in orientation  
food sovereignty, food justice and food democracy  have also emerged, partly in 
recognition of the limitations of the food security model, but also in more direct 
opposition to increasing corporate domination and injustices affecting different groups 
both globally and locally.  
 
Academic interest in food security, food sovereignty, food justice and food democracy 
has mushroomed since the global food and financial crisis of 2008-9, signalling 
renewed recognition of the need to find new and different ways to tackle the exigencies 
and socio-ecological inequities of the continually globalising food system. While it is 
true that each of these approaches stems from a distinctive empirical and theoretical 
location, and each promotes attention to different actors, interests and geographical 
scales, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive: they can also be seen as relational 
and overlapping, rather than in direct opposition to each other.3 Nevertheless, not only 
                                                     
1 Jennifer, Clapp, Food (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2012). 
2 Eric Holt-Giménez and Annie Shattuck, Food crises, food regimes and food movements: rumblings of reform or 
tides of transformation?, Journal of Peasant Studies, 38:1 (2011), pp. 10944. 
3 Jennifer Clapp, Food security and food sovereignty Getting past the binary, Dialogues in Human Geography, 4:2 
(2014), pp. 20611. 
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have these ideas been the subject of theoretical, empirical and definitional wrangling, 
but a growing body of literature has focused attention on problems with them, 
including, amongst others, that they are either too consumer- or too producer-focused, 
unduly romantic and localist,4  inward-looking, or anthropocentric.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to draw on these discourses and their critiques to identify 
the pre-requisites for a new and more comprehensive approach to global food 
governance. This is not to dismiss the existing discourses  as each is useful and 
important  but rather to say that each is lacking in some way; indeed, there are two 
striking omissions. The first is the inclusion of a meaningful approach to the 
democratisation of food, the central argument of this paper. The second is that none 
takes into account the interests of nonhuman animals. This omission is stark given the 
increasing recognition of the moral worth of sentient animals not only in the academic 
literature, but also in law.5 It further argues that these proposed pre-requisites are 
incredibly demanding and sometimes in tension. So, any new approach by which to 
organise contemporary food systems must find some way of accommodating and 
balancing these competing demands. The paper posits that this is best done through 
deliberative democratic processes at the local, national, regional and global level.  
 
The paper analyses the possibilities for a deliberative approach to the democratisation 
of food over two parts. In the first, the existing ideas of food security, food sovereignty, 
food justice and food democracy are introduced and analysed in order to establish the 
necessary conditions for an alternative approach to food governance. In the second, we 
examine how these prerequisites might be best met. To begin, we argue that because 
                                                     
4 Alberto Alonso-Fradejas, Saturnino M. Borras Jr, Todd Holmes, Eric Holt-Giménez, and Martha Jane Robbins, 
Food sovereignty: convergence and contradictions, conditions and challenges, Third World Quarterly, 36:3 (2015), 
pp. 43148; Henry Bernstein, Food Sovereignty via the Peasant Way: A Skeptical View, The Journal of Peasant 
Studies, 41:6 (2014), pp. 103163; Katharine Bradley and Hank Herrera, Decolonizing Food Justice: Naming, 
Resisting, and Researching Colonizing Forces in the Movement, Antipode, 48:1 (2016), pp. 97114. 
5 Anne Peters, Global Animal Law: What It Is and Why We Need It, Transnational Environmental Law, 5:1 (2016), 
pp. 923; Christopher Schlottmann and Jeff Sebo, Food, animals, and the environment: an ethical approach (New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2018). 
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some of the goods which a food system must realise are sometimes in tension  take, for 
example, the need to protect livelihoods and the need to respect the interests of 
nonhuman animals  we need an approach which can balance them in ways that can be 
regarded as legitimate by the relevant affected parties. This provides the basic rationale 
for the democratisation of food: all relevant actors in the food system should be able to 
have their interests heard and represented in decisions regarding how it is produced, 
distributed and consumed. However, the paper goes on to argue that achieving a fair 
balance requires participants to move beyond bare self-interest when making such 
decisions. As such, it draws on theories of deliberative democracy which argue that 
decision-making should not merely be the result of expressed preferences, but should 
instead follow practices of evidence-gathering, discussion and reason-giving. We argue 
that such deliberative tools can and should be applied to food. In the third and final part, 
we argue that before deciding the shape of deliberative fora, we need first to look at 
what kinds of issues will be deliberated: i.e. we need to discuss the scope and remit of 
deliberation. Here, we offer some initial reflections on how that might be done, drawing 
on and extending several existing examples from within the global food system. We 
conclude by suggesting that organising the scope and remit of deliberation around food 
type offers one promising way to include all relevant affected parties and to address 
imbalances of power. 
 
 
Section 1: Analysing Existing Approaches to Food Governance 
 
This section introduces and analyses the existing ideas of food security, food 
sovereignty, food justice and food democracy, and the discourses  sometimes 
overlapping  that coalesce around each, in order to establish what the pre-requisites for 
a new approach to food governance might be. 
 
  5 
 
 
1.1 Food Security  
 
Food security has long been the dominant approach to addressing the challenges of the 
global food system. Operating at the level of international development organisations 
and governance regimes, the concept arose amid discussions of the 1970s global food 
crisis when experts feared that increased food prices represented a threat to food 
availability for the worlds poor and hungry.6 One of the earliest definitions of food 
security, from the World Food Conference in 1974, attests to the international, security 
and supply dimensions: it is the common responsibility of the entire international 
community to ensure the availability at all times of adequate world food supplies of 
basic food-stuffs by way of appropriate reserves.7 Since then, the concept has gained 
increasing prominence in the international development arena, prompting a plethora of 
meanings and usages, accommodating: a Malthusian concern for food supply 
(availability); Amartya Sens broadening of the debate to include food entitlement 
(accessibility);8 the inclusion of contemporary livelihoods approaches; and a focus on 
the household level. This has led to the most commonly used definition of food security 
which exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences 
for an active and healthy life.9 
 
Securing adequate nutrition for all humans is vitally important from any ethical or 
political standpoint. Food security policies can be seen to have increased the availability 
                                                     
6 FAO, World Food Security: A Reappraisal of the Concepts and Approaches (Rome: FAO, 1983); Simon 
Maxwell, Food security: a post-modern perspective, Food Policy, 21:2 (1996), pp. 15570. 
7 United Nations, Report of the World Food Conference (5-16 November 1974) (New York, NY: United Nations, 
1975), p. 6. 
8 Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1981). 
9 FAO, Rome Declaration of World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action (Rome: FAO, 1996), p. 
3. 
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of calories in many developing countries. These calories, however, have been 
increasingly derived from imported processed foods that are high in salt, fats and 
sugar.10 Food security discourses, therefore, have been criticised for not taking into 
account who produced the food and how it was produced. Some critics (perhaps 
unfairly, because it was originally an open-ended concept) also apply a normative 
agenda to food security. 11 They argue that policy responses from the development and 
aid arena  such as the World Bank and the United Nations (UN) Food and Agricultural 
Organisation (FAO)  tend to fit within the overarching neoliberal paradigm that 
positions industrial agriculture as the solution to food insecurity.12  
 
Nonetheless, food securitys primary focus on adequate human nutrition overlooks 
other important ethical goods that a just food system ought to respect: in particular, 
animals and the environment are rarely given a place within such discourses. 
Furthermore, food security tends to be reformist rather than radical, and therefore 
notably does not address power relations and their global imbalance.13 Similarly, where 
food security aligns with productivist discourses, the focus on technology and 
production does not guarantee adequate nutrition for all. Although technical advances 
must have some role to play in an equitable food system (such as the use of GPS and 
soil monitoring), we must also address issues such as equity and distribution. Therefore, 
any new approach must retain the focus on providing sufficient levels of human 
nutrition while also going beyond it to include consideration of how food is produced, 
the effects of that production on humans and nonhumans, and where it comes from. 
 
 
 
                                                     
10 FAO, State of Insecurity in the CARICOM Caribbean (Rome, Italy: FAO, 2015). 
11 Clapp (2014), p. 207. 
12 Philip McMichael and Mindi Schneider, Food security politics and the Millennium Development Goals, Third 
World Quarterly, 32:1 (2011), pp. 119139.  
13 Eric Holt-Giménez and Annie Shattuck, Food crises, food regimes and food movements: rumblings of reform or 
tides of transformation?, Journal of Peasant Studies, 38:1 (2011), pp. 10944. 
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1.2 Food Sovereignty  
 
More radical in its orientation, food sovereignty is both a movement and an approach 
that developed in the global South in opposition to the increasingly globalised nature of 
food systems, corporate domination, trade liberalisation and agricultural 
industrialisation. Thought to have roots in a 1983 Mexican government food 
programme,14 the concept stems from a geographical and political environment where 
farmers or peasants struggle directly against such processes and changes in the global 
political economy. It operates at the level of agrarian and labour organisations and is 
grounded in discourses of redistribution and rights.15 The idea was first introduced onto 
the global stage by the international peasant movement, collectively known as La Vía 
Campesina, at the World Food Summit held in Rome in 1996, who defined it as: the 
right of each nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to produce its basic foods 
respecting cultural and productive diversity.16 However, the definition has broadened 
over time, most notably from the right of nations  with a focus on the state  to the 
right of peoples to define their own food and agriculture in 2002.17 Most recently, in 
2007, the Nyéléni Declaration defined it as: the right of peoples to healthy and 
culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable 
methods, and their right to define their own food and agricultural systems.18  
 
The key point is that it brings fundamental questions of rights, democracy and control to 
the centre of discussions about food security. It emphasises the right to food and the 
right to feed; agrarian and land reform; people-centred, small-scale diversified 
agriculture; domestic-orientated food production; sustainable livelihoods for farmers 
                                                     
14 Marc Edelman, Food Sovereignty: Forgotten Genealogies and Future Regulatory Challenges, Journal of Peasant 
Studies (2014), 41:6, pp.959-978.  
15 Holt-Giménez and Shattuck (2011). 
16 La Vía Campesina, Declaration of Food Sovereignty (Rome: La Vía Campesina, 1996), p. 1. 
17 International Planning Committee (IPC) 2002 definition 
18 Declaration of Nyéléni (2009) Sélingué, Mali. Available at: https://nyeleni.org/spip.php?article290 
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and agricultural workers; and sustainable agricultural practices.19 It also accentuates the 
importance of womens roles and their disproportionate constitution of the worlds poor 
and hungry.20 Although, the emphasis on family farming in the Nyéleni Declaration, 
which relies on womens unpaid labour, arguably goes against claims made about 
advancing womens rights.21 Finally, it calls for increased accountability of 
international actors, strengthening of local and regional food systems, and for decision-
making to be brought back under the purview of people and state.  
 
With a more political and normative agenda, food sovereignty, consequently, 
incorporates more ethical goods than food security, such as environmental justice and 
equity, and also places a much stronger emphasis on livelihoods. It also incorporates 
marginalised voices and puts forward an environmentally friendly method of 
production: agroecology. It is also clear that food sovereignty explicitly aims to address 
power imbalances in the global food system. Nonetheless, the approach has been 
critiqued for its problematic and unresolved ideals of localism and self-sufficiency 
versus the reality of international trade.22 Others have problematised its seemingly 
unduly romantic view of the peasant way and small farming as the solution to inequity 
in the global food system.23 Finally, it can easily slide into a simplistic and problematic 
relativism, assuming that the way things are done in a given community should be free 
from critique and change. These issues are problematic because it is evident that 
contemporary food production does and must engage more than one community, 
meaning that we require an approach which is transnational in scope. Finally, and as 
                                                     
19 Miguel A. Altieri, Agroecology, Small Farms, and Food Sovereignty, in Fred Magdoff and Brian Tokar (eds), 
$JULFXOWXUHDQGIRRGLQFULVLV(?FRQIOLFWUHVLVWDQFHDQGUHQHZDO1HZ<RUN0RQWKO\5HYLHZ3UHVVSS
66. 
20 Richard Goulet, Food Sovereignty: A Step Forward in the Realisation of the Right to Food, Law, Social Justice 
& Global Development Journal, 1 (2009). 
21 Agarwal, Bina., Food sovereignty, food security and democratic choice: critical contradictions, difficult 
conciliations, Journal of Peasant Studies, pp.1-22. 
22 Bina Agarwal, Food Sovereignty, Food Security and Democratic Choice: Critical Contradictions, Difficult 
Conciliations, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 41:6 (2014), pp. 124768. 
23 Bernstein (2014). 
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with food security, food sovereignty omits consideration of the place of animals and 
their particular vulnerabilities within the food system.  
 
1.3 Food Justice  
 
Food justice is also both a movement and an approach to governing the food system. 
However, it differs substantially from food sovereignty in terms of origin and 
orientation. Largely emerging from environmental and racial justice movements in the 
United States, its focuses on injustices that disproportionately affect people based on 
race and class.24 Rather than focusing on peasant production, it is more associated with 
the work of community groups and organisations, such as eat local movements, 
Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) groups, urban agriculture, farmers markets, 
and school and community gardens in the global North. Although, there are also now 
burgeoning movements in the global South.25 A distinction is often made between, on 
the one hand, food justice with its concern for social justice, race, marginalised socio-
economic groups and well-being, and, on the other, what has come to be known as the 
Alternative Food Movement (AFM), which, according to some, is primarily 
championed by the white, Western, middle class and privileged elite who promote local, 
organic, healthy and sustainable eating and food production.26  
 
Gottlieb and Joshi define food justice as: ensuring that the benefits and risks of 
where, what, and how food is grown and produced, transported and distributed, and 
accessed and eaten are shared fairly.27 For them, it has three key components: seeking 
to challenge and restructure the dominant food system; a focus on equity and 
                                                     
24 Jessica Clendenning, Wolfram H. Dressler, and Carol Richards, Food justice or food sovereignty? Understanding 
the rise of urban food movements in the USA, Agriculture and Human Values, 33 (2016), pp.165-177; Robert 
Gottlieb and Anupama Joshi, Food Justice (MIT Press, 2010), p. 6. 
25 Grace Githiri, Enhancing food justice for urban communities in Africa, available at: {UN Volunteers, 
https://www.unv.org/our-stories/enhancing-food-justice-urban-communities-africa} accessed 24 September 2019. 
26 Holt-Giménez and Shattuck (2011). 
27 Gottlieb and Joshi (2010), p. 6. 
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disparities and the struggles by those who are most vulnerable; and establishing 
linkages and common goals with other forms of social justice activism and 
advocacy.28 However, despite its powerful appeal, they argue that it remains a 
relatively unformed concept, subject to multiple interpretations a work in progress, 
residing at the edges of an emerging alternative food movement.29 Therefore, arguably 
there is a lack of clarity in the food justice movement about what, exactly, food justice 
is, and what it should look like.  
 
Nonetheless, it does go beyond food security to connect food issues to fundamental 
matters of social justice, such as civil rights, environmental justice, health and poverty. 
The attention given to urban locales also distinguishes it from food sovereigntys 
predominant focus on rural peasantries and means that it accepts the reality of most 
consumers existence. However, and in spite of attempts to separate it from the AFM, 
the dominant narrative has been critiqued as largely white and middle-class and 
ignoring racial and class injustice.30 As such, marginalised voices and agency are often 
therefore squeezed out.  
 
Food justice has also been critiqued for a tendency towards the conflation of more just 
with more local.31 Such localism is problematic, for while the benefits of community 
organising and local food networks can prove fruitful  reduced fuel use, increased 
participation, knowledge sharing and involvement in decision-making  scholars 
generally agree that it is a mistake to see changing the scale from global to local as a 
solution in itself. Furthermore, in some cases (depending on the project) food justice 
also fails to challenge the dominant paradigm of food production by working within it 
                                                     
28 Gottlieb and Joshi (2010), p. ix. 
29 Gottlieb and Joshi (2010), pp. 56. 
30 Alison Hope Alkon and Julian Agyeman, Cultivating Food Justice: Race, Class, and Sustainability (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2011); Bradley and Herrera (2016); Julie Guthman, If they only knew: The unbearable whiteness of 
alternative food, in Alison Hope Alkon and Julian Agyeman (eds), Cultivating food justice: Race, class, and 
sustainability (2011), pp. 263281. 
31 K. Cadieux and Rachel Slocum, What does it mean to do food justice?, Journal of Political Ecology, (2015), pp. 
126. 
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rather than against it, fetishising consumption for profit, and seeing people as 
consumers rather than citizens.32 Indeed, less attention is also given to the role of the 
state, to issues of governance and regulation, and tackling the roots of structural 
inequalities.  
 
1.4  Food Democracy 
Food democracy differs from the preceding approaches in that it focuses explicitly on 
citizen participation in decision-making about the food system. The concept is often 
attributed to Tim Langs coining of the term in the mid-1990s to highlight the need to 
counter the increasing control of private capital over the food system and to achieve the 
right of all citizens to have access to a decent, affordable, health-enhancing diet, grown 
in conditions in which they can have confidence.33 Its roots, therefore, lie in debates on 
environmental sustainability and social nutrition.34 Blake suggests that in comparison to 
food sovereignty and food justice, it is less concerned with identity politics and its key 
actors tend to be from backgrounds that have historically had more political purchase 
in local, national, and global political arenas.35 According to Hassanein, at its core is 
the idea that people can and should be actively participating in shaping the food 
system.36 She sees this as particularly necessary for agrifood systems where values and 
interests are constantly in conflict over the contested nature of sustainability and 
delineates five key dimensions of food democracy: collaboration; becoming 
knowledgeable; sharing ideas; developing efficacy; and acquiring an orientation 
                                                     
32 Julian Agyeman and Jesse McEntee, Moving the Field of Food Justice Forward Through the Lens of Urban 
Political Ecology, Geography Compass, 8:3 (2014), pp. 21120; Alison Hope Alkon, Food Justice and the 
Challenge to Neoliberalism, Gastronomica: The Journal of Critical Food Studies, 14:2 (2014), pp. 2740; Charles Z. 
Levkoe, Learning Democracy Through Food Justice Movements, Agriculture and Human Values, 23:1 (2006), pp. 
8998. 
33 Tim Lang, Towards a Food Democracy, in Sian Griffiths and Jennifer Wallace (eds), Consuming Passions: Food 
in the Age of Anxiety (Manchester University Press, 1998), p. 18. 
34 Megan Blake, Landscape and the politics of food justice, In Joshua Zeunert and tim Waterman Routledge 
Handbook of Landscape and Food (pp. 487-499). Routledge. 
35 Blake (2018), p.491 
36 Neva Hassanein, Practicing food democracy: a pragmatic politics of transformation, Journal of Rural Studies, 
19:1 (2003), p. 79. 
  12 
towards the community good.37 Food democracy is therefore about citizen power and 
seeking to organise the food system in a way that people can directly engage with the 
decisions made in their own food system.38 
 
The demand for participation means, therefore, that food democracy is often articulated 
by activists as a vision that is decentralised and organised at a scale where democratic 
needs can be met.39 Moragues-Faus argues that egalitarian food democracies should 
be place-contingent and revolve around the construction of spaces where people have 
the capacity to act politically allowing for the meeting of heterogenous needs, interests 
and non-recognised voices and connectivity at different scales.40 Therefore, it is often 
placed-based, local and connected to projects such as farmers markets, urban 
agriculture, CSA, food policy councils and food box schemes. In this way food 
democracy overlaps with food justice. However, rather than voting with your dollar 
the focus here is to vote with our vote.41 These ideals are therefore positioned in sharp 
opposition to those of the corporate food system which is based on elite power and 
decision-making. Whilst most work on food democracy focuses on the local scale, 
Vandana Shiva also mobilises the concept at the global level. She calls for the 
democratisation of control over access to and distribution of resources such as land, 
water and credit to counteract the dictatorship of multi-national food corporations.42 
However, beyond calls for increased citizen involvement and democratic governance, 
the concept remains relatively underdeveloped at this level. 
 
                                                     
37 Neva Hassanein, Locating food democracy: Theoretical and practical ingredients, Journal of Hunger & 
Environmental Nutrition, 3:23 (2008), pp. 286308. 
38 Carlson and Chappell (2015), pp.6-7. 
39 Josée Johnston, Andrew Biro, and Norah MacKendrick, Lost in the Supermarket: The Corporate-Organic 
Foodscape and the Struggle for Food Democracy, Antipode, 41:3 (2009), pp. 50932. 
40 Ana Moragues-Faus, Problematising justice definitions in public food security debates: Towards global and 
participative food justices, Geoforum, 84 (2017), p. 472. 
41 Jill Carlson and Jahi M. Chappell, Deepening Food Democracy, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy: 
Washington, DC (2015) p.6 
42 Vandana, Shiva Earth Democracy: Justice, Sustainability and Peace (London: Zed Books, 2005),  
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The idea of transforming people into citizens rather than consumers is therefore central 
to food democracy.43 As will be shown in the next part of the paper, we share the view 
that the ongoing participation of affected parties in the food system is essential to the 
project of reforming it. However, food democracy as it currently stands very much 
focuses on consumers/citizens and the role and interests of other important groups in the 
food system, such as producers, processors, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
corporations and farmed animals is somewhat less clear. It has also faced scepticism 
from some who cast doubts on the values underpinning liberal democratic practices 
as deployed by the governments of nation-states.44 Importantly, as was the case with 
both food sovereignty and food justice, in its place-based focus, food democracy also 
currently lacks a strong engagement with the international dimension of the food 
systems, limiting its transformative potential.  
 
1.5 Pre-Requisites of an Alternative Approach to Food Governance 
 
Having surveyed and evaluated the dominant discourses on governing the global food 
system, we are now better placed to explore our alternative which seeks to overcome 
the evident shortcomings of these existing perspectives, while maintaining and 
combining the important insights that they undoubtedly provide. So, what are the pre-
requisites for this new approach?  
 
Food security, food sovereignty, food justice and food democracy have all revealed that 
a robust and just food system must realise a number of important goods. Food security 
has shown us that it must meet the nutritional and health needs of a growing 
population. That means it must ensure that sufficient nutritionally adequate food is 
produced. Moreover, food security and food justice show us that it must be distributed 
                                                     
43 John Coveney and Booth, Food Democracy: From Consumer to Food Citizen (New York, NY: Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg, 2015). 
44 Ana Moragues-Faus, Emancipatory or Neoliberal Food Politics? Exploring the Politics of Collectivity of 
Buying Groups in the Search for Egalitarian Food Democracies, Antipode, 49:2 (2017), p. 461. 
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equitably. Food sovereignty and food justice, moreover, demonstrate that it must 
produce food in a way that supports livelihoods  including small-scale producers who 
are vulnerable to the power of inordinately larger national and multinational 
corporations  and in a way that is environmentally sustainable. This means not only 
that production practices must not exhaust vital natural resources, including that of the 
soil and land themselves, but they must also refrain from producing waste, gases and 
other pollutants at levels which threaten the opportunities for current and future 
generations to lead flourishing lives. Finally, food democracy and food justice illustrate 
how a just food system must be shaped by the participation of relevant affected parties.  
 
There are two striking absences from each of these approaches. The first is that little 
consideration is given to the meaningful democratisation of food at different levels, 
which Section 2 will shortly discuss in depth. The second is acknowledgement that a 
just food system must also recognise the sentience and moral worth of nonhuman 
animals. In other words, the ways in which food is produced, distributed and consumed 
must be compatible with the fact that many animals have complex cognitive and 
emotional capacities  which entails that they have a value of their own which cannot 
be reduced to their ability to provide protein for human beings.45 Crucially, while a 
good deal of domestic animal welfare legislation acknowledges that sentient animals 
have this kind of worth46, meaningful protection of them in the food system 
nevertheless fails to materialise for at least three reasons.  
 
Firstly, some jurisdictions like the United States exempt farmed animals from federal 
animal welfare laws, thus permitting all sorts of harmful practices on those used for 
food which are prohibited in relation to others (such as pets). Second, even where 
animal welfare legislation does apply to farmed livestock, this is dramatically limited by 
                                                     
45 Much has of course been written in defence of this view, but one of the classic statements comes in Peter Singer, 
Animal Liberation 2nd ed. (London: Pimlico, 1995). 
46 See, for example, Article 13 Title II of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU): 
<https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/welfare_en> 
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the fact it generally adopts a framework of humane regulation; that is, it only outlaws 
those harmful practices which are deemed to cause unnecessary suffering to animals. 
The problem here is that what is deemed necessary and unnecessary is driven solely 
by human interests and concerns, meaning that the desire for plentiful cheap meat, eggs 
and milk is necessarily prioritized over the basic interests and lives of the cognitively 
complex and social animals bred, confined and killed to produce these foods.47 Finally, 
even if robust legislation could be enacted at a domestic level, such efforts are 
inevitably undermined by the lack of animal welfare laws at the international level. The 
absence of such standards allows corporations to move production to jurisdictions with 
lower regulations, ensuring that the harms perpetrated against animals in our global 
food system continue to rise.48        
 
But the moral worth of nonhuman animals is just one good which systems of global 
food governance must recognise and promote. What is consequently required is an 
approach that combines all of the important prerequisites we have outlined, and, on that 
basis, overcomes their individual limitations. In addition, and as food justice informs us, 
when promoting these goods, it must recognise the imbalances of power within 
societies. In other words, the approach must acknowledge that access to nutritionally 
adequate food is inextricably tied up with social cleavages around class, race, gender, 
and more; put simply, it must acknowledge that food is an issue of social justice. But it 
must also acknowledge that our food system is a global justice issue too  thus 
acknowledging the power imbalances within, but also across, state boundaries. This is 
crucial in virtue of the fact that food supply chains are international in nature, meaning 
that any alteration in one part of the supply and consumption chain will often have 
effects in multiple and quite remote locations.  
 
                                                     
47 Darian Ibrahim, The AntiCruelty Statute: A Study in Animal Welfare, Journal of Animal Law and Ethics 1 
(2006), pp. 175-204. 
48 Steven White, Into the Void: International Law and the Protection of Animal Welfare, Global Policy 4:4 (2013), 
pp. 391-398. 
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Section 2: The Democratisation of Food: A Deliberative Approach 
 
We now explore how the prerequisites outlined in Section 1 might be best met. We do 
this by first providing a basic rationale for the democratisation of food. We then draw 
on theories of deliberative democracy in order to argue that decision-making should not 
merely be the result of expressed preferences, but should instead follow practices of 
evidence gathering and reason-giving.  
 
2.1 Democratising Food 
Coming up with an approach to governing the food system which incorporates all of 
these prerequisites is incredibly demanding. Indeed, there is no possible way in which 
any food system could fully realise all of these goods absolutely. And that is quite 
simply because sometimes these goods are in tension. For example, consider the tension 
between supporting livelihoods and respecting the moral worth of nonhuman animals: 
millions of farmers across the world make their living from breeding, confining and 
slaughtering animals. As such, fully recognising the moral worth of animals necessarily 
entails putting some constraints on livelihoods, just as promoting farmer livelihoods 
constrains respecting the interests of animals. Crucially, this particular tension is not 
some strange outlier; for the simple fact is that attempts to promote any one good within 
food production, supply and consumption will often come at the expense of some other 
important good. This makes any simple framework by which to reimagine and remodel 
our global food system either hopelessly naïve, or radically incomplete. If we 
acknowledge the range of goods with which food engages, we must also recognise the 
complexity of devising a framework by which we can remodel and transform our global 
food system. 
 
In light of this plurality of goods, which are frequently in tension, how ought we to 
proceed in designing a new approach to governing the food system? One possibility 
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would be to simply rank these goods in order of priority, so that when a clash between 
them occurs, it is resolved by prioritising that good which has greater value. In this way, 
we might assert that nutritional health wins out over distributional equity, which wins 
out over livelihoods, which wins out over environmental sustainability and so on. The 
problem with this approach  and which the ranking example probably makes clear  is 
that any hierarchical arrangement of these different goods is going to be rather difficult 
to justify. First of all, many would argue that these goods are incommensurable.49 
After all, how could one defend the idea that livelihoods ought to be prioritised over 
environmental sustainability? What, precisely, is the shared currency between these two 
goods, of which livelihoods has more? Furthermore, even if we suppose that it is 
possible to rank these goods, any ranking that we come up with is bound to be 
extremely controversial, and contested as such. Obviously, by itself such contestation 
would not render that ranking wrong  but it would make it unlikely that any new food 
system built on it could be endorsed by relevant parties, undermining its prospects of 
being established and maintained. 
 
What we are searching for, then, is a food system which balances these different goods 
 and achieves that balance in a way that can be reasonably accepted by the relevant 
affected parties. It is here that the case for democratising the food system can be made. 
This is because democratic procedures provide a means by which a plurality of goods, 
interests and preferences can be balanced  and by which the outcome can be accepted. 
Democratic processes are commonly thought to provide a means by which all affected 
individuals  can have their say over some decision.50 And, even though some 
individuals may end up not having their preferred interests win out, because each has 
participated in the procedure, each can also be reasonably expected to accept the result 
as legitimate. So, if we were to truly democratise food, the balance and prioritisation of 
                                                     
49 see Nien-hê Hsieh, Incommensurable Values, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016). 
50 Robert E. Goodin, Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 35:1 
(2007), pp. 4068. 
  18 
all the relevant goods outlined previously would be constructed by the relevant parties 
in the food system, rather than imposed by any particular political or ethical framework. 
 
In response to this call to democratise food two immediate objections might be raised. 
The first concerns whether our proposal offers anything different to the existing 
discourses around food democracy, which we outlined earlier in the paper. After all, 
food democracy also places participation at its heart, arguing that the food system needs 
to be governed not by corporate forces, but by those whom it affects. And yet, our call 
to democratise food differs from existing notions of food democracy in at least three 
fundamental ways. For one, the food democratisation advocated in this paper cannot 
just take place within one community. Instead, we must face up to the globalised and 
interconnected nature of the food system, and the ways in which the goods are set back 
and promoted transnationally. Relatedly, recognising that the democratisation of food 
must be global in scope means that all affected parties  and not only consumers  must 
participate in the proper balancing of the competing goods at stake: it is essential that 
producers, distributors and other workers have their voices heard in redesigning and 
shaping the food system, and this applies to both human and nonhuman parties. As 
sentient creatures who can experience themselves in the world, farmed animals are 
obviously affected by food production, distribution and consumption. Since our food 
system must take their worth seriously, it is vital that their interests shape food policies. 
While they cannot themselves vote for particular outcomes, it is possible to imagine 
proxies acting on their behalf who ensure that their voices are heard.51  
 
The final reason why our call to democratise food differs from more conventional 
notions of food democracy comes down to its underlying rationale. The impetus behind 
the democratisation of food is not merely to turn consumers into engaged citizens 
                                                     
51 On representing animals politically see, Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal 
Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); and Eva Meijer, Political Communication with Animals, 
Humanimalia 5:1 (2013). 
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concerned about the source and quality of produce; instead, the ultimate justification for 
democratisation comes from recognising the plurality of goods which are at stake. 
Empowering consumers is obviously an important good, but it is not the only one 
engaged by food, and democratisation is required in order to balance the various and 
often competing goods upon which food impacts. So, for us, democratising food must 
mean more than simply taking power away from corporations and giving it to the 
people. After all, the people are not a homogenous entity, but individuals with often 
very different stakes in the food system. Democratising food thus entails recognising 
and facing up to these multiple goods, and establishing fair procedures which 
acknowledge that the best way to balance those goods is through the participation of all 
affected parties at each point across the food system so that they can shape how our 
food is produced, shared and consumed.  
 
The second objection is whether it is wise to open up the food system to democratic 
forces. After all, as we have seen, the global food system is incredibly complex, 
involving myriad actors and engaging a whole host of interwoven political and ethical 
goods. It might be argued that, in the face of such complexity, what we need is expertise 
rather than democracy. This would chime with some recent calls in political theory in 
favour of so-called epistocracy over democracy: if we are interested in creating forms 
of governance that produce the right outcomes, it is vital that those in charge of 
decision-making are competent and sufficiently well-informed about the issues facing 
them.52 But this objection misses the mark for at least two reasons. In the first place, we 
need to question whether there is some single determinate and correct balance of these 
competing goods to be had. Many would argue that the proper balance is one that is 
constructed by those with a stake in it, rather than out there to be discovered. More 
importantly, even if there is some definitive correct balance, that answer will not be of 
                                                     
52 For example, see Jason Brennan, Against Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016); and David 
Estlund, Why not Epistocracy? in N. Reshotko (ed.). Desire, Identity and Existence. Essays in Honor of T. M. 
Penner (Kelowna, BC: Academic Printing & Publishing), 5369. 
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much use in the real world if it is rejected by those affected by it. For this reason, and as 
we argue, greater democratisation has the political advantage of producing decisions 
which all can live with, even if not all can agree with. Moreover, democracy and 
expertise are not mutually exclusive. Lack of knowledge amongst affected parties does 
not by itself provide a reason to exclude those individuals from decision-making; rather, 
it provides a reason to create mechanisms by which to improve the understanding of 
those parties. And the kinds of deliberative fora proposed later in this paper  where 
individuals are exposed to alternative ideas and to evidence from experts  are certainly 
intended to have educative potential.  
 
 
2.2 The Deliberative Democratisation of Food 
 
But what kind of democratic participation is required to balance these goods? It might 
be thought that relevant parties across the food system ought to be granted a vote in 
order that each can have their say over the production, distribution and consumption of 
food. However, democratising food requires more than mere voting. For one, on what 
issue should parties be granted a vote? Decisions over food production, consumption 
and how to balance the various competing goods at stake, are complex matters that can 
rarely be reduced to binary choices. As such, it seems we need participative decision-
making procedures that are sensitive to such complexity. Secondly, there are various 
problems with a decision-making procedure that simply aggregates the preferences of 
affected parties. While such aggregation will help to construct a balance between the 
various goods at stake, it is dubious that it will construct the best possible balance. 
Preferences of individuals are not and should not be fixed; many are based on brute 
self-interest. What we argue for is a balance of goods and interests that, while inevitably 
creating winners and losers, can nonetheless be meaningfully described as oriented 
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towards the common good.53 Aggregating unreflective self-interested preferences, 
however, undermines such a goal. Instead, then, we require a decision-making 
procedure which allows for preferences to be both transformed and oriented towards the 
common good. A final problem with simple aggregation is that it can also create 
permanent minorities  that is, groups whose interests are always dwarfed numerically 
by other parties  irrespective of the validity of their views. This suggests that a process 
that at least provides opportunities for these minority interests to win out is also 
required. 
 
In order to overcome these problems, a number of democratic theorists have advocated 
deliberative decision-making processes.54 While the nature of these processes is 
varied, they all share the core idea that democratic participation is not best realised 
through one-off voting by citizens, but rather through their coming together to discuss, 
debate and deliberate over policy options. Whether such deliberations occur in citizen 
assemblies, juries, town hall meetings or other mini-publics, the core idea is to get 
affected parties together to hear from experts, listen to the views of others, reflect on 
their own preferences, and make an informed collective decision. In this way, 
deliberative procedures facilitate each of the goals outlined previously: they allow for 
decision-making over complex issues; they encourage individuals to think about what is 
best for the community as a whole; they allow for preferences to be transformed; and 
they also allow minority views to be aired and even eventually to win out.  
 
Our call, then, is for the food system to be democratised in order that affected parties 
can shape the production, distribution and consumption of food via deliberative fora at 
all different levels along the food chain. In this way, we believe, an appropriate balance 
                                                     
53 Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit (eds), The Good 
Polity: Normative Analysis of the State (New York: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 1734. 
54 John S. Dryzek, Deliberative democracy and beyond: liberals, critics, contestations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002); Jon Elster, Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 1998); Amy Gutman and Dennis 
Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton University Press, 2004). 
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of the goods previously outlined can be constructed; and because that balance is the 
outcome of fair procedures, it is one that all can be reasonably expected to respect as 
legitimate. 
 
Section 3: From Theory to Practice 
 
The purpose of this paper is not to provide a fine-grained blueprint of what a 
deliberative democratic food system must look like. Indeed, producing such detailed 
prescriptions is futile: for one, a good deal of institutional innovation and 
experimentation will be required; and furthermore, it seems likely that a variety of 
institutional arrangements might be able to fulfil the desiderata previously outlined. 
Nonetheless, what is clear is that not just any institutional arrangement will do, and that 
certain ones will perform better than others. But it is also apparent that a democratised 
food system does not need to be conjured out of nothing. Indeed, since the so-called 
participatory turn in global food governance,55 processes of participation and 
deliberation have made some in-roads in food system governance. Community 
organisations and large international organisations such as the FAO have begun to 
recognise the need for improving accountability, deliberation and participation.  
 
What can we draw from these existing practices? One lesson is that it is unclear what 
precisely affected parties should be deliberating over. That is to say, what should the 
scope and remit of deliberation be? Deliberation about food could be broad and all-
encompassing: we could deliberate about food as a whole system and ask what does a 
good food system look like? Another approach would be to deliberate thematically by 
food-related issues, such as biotechnology or contracts. Yet a third approach could be to 
deliberate on issues related to a particular type of food, such as chicken or tomatoes. 
                                                     
55 see: J. Duncan and D. Barling, Renewal through Participation in Global Food Security Governance: Implementing 
the International Food Security and Nutrition Civil Society Mechanism to the Committee on World Food Security, 
International Journal of the Sociology of Agriculture and Food, 19 (2012), pp. 14361. 
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This section evaluates each of these approaches by drawing on real-world examples, 
and concludes that organising deliberation around food type offers significant potential 
benefits.  
 
 
3.1 Deliberating on Food as a Whole System Approach at the National and Global 
Level) 
 
One approach to tackling the challenges of our food system is to acknowledge the many 
interrelated issues  such as food poverty, public health, biodiversity loss, climate 
change and animal welfare  and, rather than tackling them separately, focus on the 
bigger picture. Questions asked might be: what would a good or sustainable food 
system look like? This is often the approach taken by those with an interest in 
developing policy and planning locally (Food Policy Councils) or nationally (food 
charters, bills, or a National Food Service). This is in part because tackling food as a big 
picture issue is necessarily complex, thus a local or national context helps to situate the 
parameters of the debate and to enable citizens to participate. Grassroots, community 
groups and other non-governmental organisations are also increasingly interested in 
deploying a range of public engagement methodologies in order to produce local food 
policy and plans that is reflective of public opinion and values.56 A whole-systems 
approach has also been adopted at the global level by initiatives such as the 
International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for 
Development (IAASTD) and the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS) which 
aims to ensure food security and nutrition for all through a process of stakeholder 
engagement. This sub-section examines an example from the national and global level 
in turn. 
 
                                                     
56 Rachel A. Ankeny, Inviting Everyone to the Table Strategies for More Effective and Legitimate Food Policy via 
Deliberative Approaches, Journal of Social Philosophy, 47:1 (2016), pp. 1024. 
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In response to the Scottish governments pledge to introduce a new law to cut across 
the food system: the Good Food Nation Bill in 2018, the Scottish Food Coalition (SFC) 
 a coalition of civil society organisations  launched a public consultation using a 
methodology popular with such groups, known as Kitchen Table Talks (KTTs).57 This 
public engagement methodology involves organising small groups of citizens to come 
together  in different locations, such as the home, local cafes, schools and community 
centres  to share their views on a particular topic. Moderated by a facilitator, KTTs are 
informal and convivial and allow everybody at the table to express their views. The 
results of the discussion are recorded and fed back to the organisers to collate.58 
Although this form of deliberation does not tend to involve any direct decision-making 
or policy-making, it is often used as a way to canvass public opinion and differing 
values about a particular issue. 
 
The aim was to find out what really matters to people about food, what they want the 
Bill to achieve, and to improve democratic processes in food and agricultural policy-
making. Groups and individuals were asked to discuss what living in a Good Food 
Nation meant to them and to devise their top five concerns and priorities for action. 
Over 800 people participated and over 140 conversations took place over a 12-week 
period. The aim was to advocate for food and agricultural policy that is made both for 
citizens and with citizens, and for joined up policy making that brings together both 
food and farming, and public health, environmental and social justice concerns.59 Public 
engagement such as this is beneficial because it has the potential to increase democratic 
legitimacy of policy and involve a wide range of actors in food policy-making. It also 
offers opportunities for civil society and citizens to learn about government policy and 
strategy. This increased knowledge leads to a more informed citizenry/civil society that 
                                                     
57 Scottish Food Coalition, A Seat at the Table: Becoming a Good Food Nation is everyones business (2018), p. 1. 
58 Lucy Parry, Kitchen Table Conversations, available at: {https://participedia.net/en/methods/kitchen-table-
conversations}. 
59 Nourish Scotland, A Good Food Nation Bill to transform Scotlands food system, available at: 
{http://www.nourishscotland.org/campaigns/good-food-nation-bill/} accessed 10 November 2018. 
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is better able to hold government to account on its policy decisions. The local and 
community level of this approach also fulfils Iris Marion Youngs call for inclusion  
which argues that decision-making and debate processes often marginalise certain 
individuals and groups  as it allows for a diverse range of people to come together in 
settings that are both familiar and accessible.60 
 
The challenge for KTTs, however, is reaching audiences beyond the food movement 
which in some cases tends to be white and middle class.61 This is because it is likely 
that volunteer hosts are already connected in some way to the cause and organisations 
involved. It also excludes, rather than includes, corporate and commercial actors. 
Therefore, although inclusive in terms of openness, not everyone with a stake is 
necessarily included, because they will not know about or even be interested in the fora. 
KTTs reveal, then, that a holistic remit can end up being dominated by groups with 
predetermined ideas about what an ideal food system could or should look like. 
Consequently, there is a possibility that many important alternative viewpoints will be 
excluded. 
 
At the global level, the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) also takes a whole-
systems approach to food security and nutrition. This UN organisation is arguably the 
most advanced example in the field of food and agriculture of a transnational body 
incorporating elements of deliberative governance. 62 The committee was established in 
1974 but underwent far-reaching reforms following the 2009-10 food price crisis.63 This 
became an opportunity to systematically integrate civil society representation within its 
framework. In its reform document, it is stated that the CFS will constitute the 
                                                     
60 Ankeny (2016); Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2000). 
61 Charles Z. Levkoe and Amanda Sheedy, A people-centred approach to food policy making: Lessons from 
Canadas Peoples Food Policy project, Journal of Hunger & Environmental Nutrition, 0:0 (2017), pp. 121. 
62 See Josh Brem-Wilson, La Vía Campesina and the UN Committee on World Food Security: Affected publics and 
institutional dynamics in the nascent transnational public sphere. Review of International Studies, 43(2), pp.302-329. 
63
 Nora McKeon Global food governance in an era of crisis: Lessons from the United Nations Committee on World 
Food Security, Canadian Food Studies 2:2 (2015), pp.328-334. 
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foremost inclusive international and intergovernmental platform for a broad range of 
committed stakeholders to work together in a coordinated manner.64 As per a 
deliberate democracy approach, it is the intention that its internal architecture will 
ensure that the voices of all relevant stakeholders  particularly those most affected by 
food insecurity  are heard.65 To this end, the committee consists of an executive 
Bureau of 12 member states and an Advisory Group, consisting of representatives from 
five different categories of Participants (including civil society and NGOs; the private 
sector; international research institutions; international financial institutions; 
philanthropic organisations; and UN Agencies). Organisations may also be invited or 
apply for Observer status.66  
 
The body has embraced elements of a deliberative approach, which are expressed in the 
composition of the organisation and also in some of the related processes. For example, 
both civil society organisations(CSOs)/NGOs and private sector actors have a right to 
organise autonomously and to consult with their constituencies prior to deliberation of a 
particular issue.67 This has led to both the creation of an autonomous Civil Society 
Mechanism (CSM) and a Private Sector Mechanism (PSM). Representation of those 
most affected by issues of food security is also prioritised.68 Therefore, the CSM 
currently has four seats on the Advisory Committee whilst the PSM has only one.69 
However, these mechanisms are not without their challenges, as the PSM has 
increasingly used its growing influence to seek to obtain changes in the participation 
                                                     
64 CFS, Reform of the Committee on World Food Security, Committee on World Food Security. Rome, (14-16 
October 2009), p2, available at: http://www.fao.org/tempref/docrep/fao/meeting/018/k7197e.pdf,  
65 CFS (2009), p.5. 
66 Committee on World Food Security (undated), CFS Structure. Available at: 
http://www.fao.org/cfs/home/about/structure/en/  
67 CFS (2009). 
68 CFS (2009). 
69 Jessica Duncan and Priscilla Claeys, Politicizing food security governance through participation: opportunities 
and opposition, Food Security, 10:6 (2018), pp.1411-1424. 
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structure of the CFS in ways that threaten the prioritization of civil society voices (for 
example, by seeking parity with the CSM on the Advisory Committee).70  
 
Ultimately, however, member states remain the ultimate decision makers as well as 
principal actors in the attainment of food security.71 The lack of change to this 
traditional structure has not gone uncontested. Hospes, for example, argues that It is 
very unlikely that the reformed CFS can become relevant for the global food security 
agenda and address the fundamental issue of food violence, if state actors do not share 
decision-making power with non-state actors.72 In other words, it is the lack of political 
rights granted to CSOs that undermines the promise of the participatory approach 
advocated for by the reformed Committee. Further democratising the CFS is therefore 
seen to be especially important because many southern farming organisations are 
interested in the forum precisely because of the prospect of holding powerful actors that 
influence their food and agricultural systems to account.73  
 
McKeon, furthermore, outlines that while the organisation favours inclusive decision-
making, when the stakes are high, the preferred approach of negotiated consensus has a 
tendency to sink towards an only marginally useful lowest common denominator.74 
This leads her to question whether on these occasions voting might be preferable to 
consensus building.75 Currently when consensus cannot be achieved between members 
and participants, states alone maintain the right to vote.76  However, it is also 
important to question whether the problem is deliberation itself, or rather that the scope 
and remit of deliberation in this case is simply too demanding. When the focus of 
                                                     
70 Duncan and Claeys, (2018) p.1418 
71 CFS (2015), p.2. 
72 Hospes, 'Food Sovereignty: The Debate, the Deadlock, and a Suggested Detour', Agriculture and Human Values 
31, no. 1 (2014): p.128. 
73 Declaration of Nyéléni (2009). 
74 McKeon (2015), p.331. 
75 McKeon (2015), p.331. 
76 Duncan and Claeys (2018), p.1414 
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decision-making is so broad, it is perhaps little wonder that participants can agree on so 
little. 
 
The workings of KTTs and the CFS thus reveal some notable limitations with 
deliberating about food holistically. Firstly, and as we have seen, the breadth of the 
focus can make it extremely difficult to arrive at meaningful agreement and determinate 
decision-making. This obviously impedes the ability to make effective beneficial 
changes to our food system. Secondly, that breadth can also allow powerful actors with 
vested interests to dominate the process. We return to the question of power in 
subsection 3.4, but for now we argue that while processes of community and multi-
stakeholder engagement will surely play a vital role in multi-layered processes of 
democratising food, those processes must have a more focused remit if the goal of 
meaningfully including all affected parties is to be furthered.  
 
3.2. Deliberating by Food-Related Issue  
  
A possible way of focusing the scope and remit of deliberative processes is to have fora 
make decisions on food-related issues. An instructive example of an attempt to 
stimulate nation-wide deliberation on a crucial issue in the contemporary food system 
comes from the Dutch Government. In 2001, a special purpose committee was charged 
with organising a nation-wide debate on the introduction of genetically modified 
organisms into the Dutch food system. The objective was three-fold: to increase the 
available information and exchange of information on biotechnology and food amongst 
a broad public; to offer opportunities for discussion and opinion formation on the use of 
modern biotechnology in food, as well as the desirable limits of such use; and to record 
the outcomes of these debates. The overall aim was to engage as large a segment as 
possible of the population in deliberating the future of food. 
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In order to realise these objectives, the Committee on Biotechnology & Food organised 
three different layers of deliberation and information gathering. First, two debates  in 
which experts, a group of 150 citizens, and Committee members played a role  were 
organised. Second, 320 civil society organisations (professional organisations, action 
groups, working groups as well as religious groups) and 2,000 schools were approached 
with an invitation to organise debates themselves but which would report to the 
Committee. Eighty social organisations and 200 schools organised such debates, 
drawing upon the committees toolbox designed for the purpose. Locally, various 
workshops, roundtables, debate nights, theatre productions and a court simulation took 
place.77 Third, the Dutch public at large was informed and invited to take part in the 
public debate and its constituent activities through information pages in several national 
newspapers as well as a free nationally distributed groceries magazine. In other words, 
through a wide range of activities the Committee sought to engage the population on the 
topic of GMOs and provided spaces and opportunities to deliberate on the potential 
implications of their introduction into the Dutch food system. Following the publication 
of the final report as well as various polling exercises it was possible to assess how the 
public evaluated a number of themes in relation to biotechnology and food and compare 
these to figures from other European countries. Overall, it was concluded that the Dutch 
did not see the added value of the use of biotechnology in view of current knowledge 
about the risks.78 
 
This deliberative exercise provides important food for thought for those interested in 
assessing the merits of an issue-based deliberative approach. In terms of inclusivity, 
issue-based deliberation seems like a useful way of engaging with affected parties. In 
the biotechnology exercise, Dutch people were provided with numerous opportunities to 
                                                     
77 J. C. Terlouw et al., Eten & Genen: een publiek debat over biotechnologie en voedel; rapport uitgebracht door de 
staatscommissie biotechnologie en voedsel., (2002). 
78 L. Hanssen, Jan M. Gutteling, L. Lagerwerf, J. Bartels, and W. Roeterdink, In de marge van het publiek debat Eten 
& Genen. Flankerend onderzoek in opdracht van de Commissie Biotechnologie en Voedsel [In the margins of the 
public debate Eating and Genes] (Universiteit Twente, Afdeling Communicatiewetenschap, 2001). 
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discuss and evaluate the issue. But while this makes the system open, it of course also 
makes it more likely for discussions to be dominated by those who are already 
politically engaged and concerned about the issue. Nonetheless, it is certainly possible 
to imagine a different issue-based deliberative exercise making concerted efforts to 
represent all relevant groups affected by that issue in its discussions, including those 
from different political communities. 
 
However, there are two wider concerns with fixing the scope and remit of deliberation 
about food to issues. One is the question of which of the myriad food-related issues are 
to be discussed. Some of these cover topics that engage with a variety of food types 
(such as biotechnology, for example), while others are only applicable to certain sectors 
(such as the castration of pigs). This raises important questions about which are chosen 
for deliberation, and, perhaps even more importantly, who gets to decide. Indeed, this 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that there is even disagreement about what counts as 
an issue at all. For example, there are groups who passionately believe that massive 
shifts towards a paleo diet will reap important health and perhaps even environmental 
benefits.79 Others, however, regard such claims as at best cranky, and at worst 
dangerous. So, who gets to determine whether this, or any other topic, is an issue 
worthy of deliberation?  
 
The other problem with issue-based deliberation derives from the fact that many issues 
are and will be appraised very differently when applied to different food types. 
Biotechnology offers an interesting example of this. After all, the Dutch public did not 
produce definitive outcomes, as either for or against the application of biotechnology 
in food. And perhaps this is no surprise when one considers that whether one is for or 
against biotechnology in food will likely depend on the type of food in question: for 
example, many people have very different instincts about the modification of animals as 
                                                     
79 Karen Pendergrass, Is the Paleo Diet Sustainable? Paleo Foundation, available at: 
{https://paleofoundation.com/is-the-paleo-diet-sustainable/} accessed 8 October 2018. 
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they do plants, particularly when it comes to plants that have already been subject to 
considerable biotechnological intervention. 
 
3.3. Deliberating by Food Type  
 
A way of plausibly including all interested parties, having a meaningful and determinate 
set of topics over which to deliberate, and being attuned to the different questions raised 
by different products, would be to organise deliberation around a specific food type. 
This model has several appealing characteristics. First of all, on an empirical level, it is 
difficult to generalise across different foods and especially different markets and supply 
chains. Differences are related to the nature of the food (such as fruits, vegetables, 
legumes, cereals, derivative products like honey or meats) since, although it is possible 
to group some foods together, perhaps based on their growing cycle or other conditions, 
most foods are actually unique. Indeed, the history of breeding or other forms of more 
advanced genetic modification means that different foods are situated within different 
material, biological and ecological contexts.  
 
Secondly, and pertinent to the question of (global) governance, food markets have 
different characteristics which need to be understood and dealt with where effective 
regulation is being considered. International commodity markets may be: thin (few 
buyers and sellers) or thick (many buyers and sellers, lots of liquidity); have derivative 
markets that influence price (futures markets); or may be mature or new. Some markets 
may have a price-floor as a result of government intervention; some may not. These 
factors may change over time and space, and all will exercise influence on productive 
conditions and labour standards. While it may be possible to speak about certain trends 
from a macro-perspective, when it comes to addressing specific conditions these vary 
greatly across food markets. Thirdly, in view of potential public apathy, it might be the 
case that governance mechanisms organised around a specific food (or food product) 
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can avoid this pitfall if institutions are built around those who are directly affected 
and/or involved in the food chain.  
 
A fourth argument is that many existing governance frameworks are in fact organised 
around a specific food, making their transformation along inclusive and deliberative 
lines, if not straightforward, then at least plausible. For example, Fairtrade International 
started its journey towards the incorporation of ethical values within food supply chains 
with bananas and coffee. Gradually it has expanded the range and scope of its activities. 
While Fairtrade is not a perfect model and the embedding of alternative networks of 
production within capitalist relations of production must be critically evaluated, the 
organisation also coordinates some of the most ethical contemporary trading networks.  
 
Organising around food type has also increasingly been adopted at a global level by 
private industry, for example, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and the 
Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef (GRSB). Of course, these groupings have been 
heavily critiqued for propelling market-centric and business narratives that mask the 
continuing negative realities of production.80 In terms of participation and accessibility, 
membership fees are often tiered by level of access to governance structures, decision-
making fora and information. For example, in RSPO, organisations that pay the highest 
fees buy the right to vote at and participate in General Assemblies, to access all RSPO 
information, and to be elected to the Board of Governors, whereas those on the lowest 
tier have no access to voting rights or information. Therefore, although in theory actors 
from across the supply chain can participate, and increasingly they do, inequitable fee 
structures prevent full inclusion (particularly for smaller and less powerful actors) and 
access to information which are both key to meaningful deliberation.  
 
                                                     
80 Peter Dauvergne, The Global Politics of the Business of Sustainable Palm Oil, Global Environmental Politics, 
18:2 (2018), pp. 3452. 
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A relatively recent  and perhaps more promising  addition to the growing number of 
multi-stakeholder fora,81 which potentially strikes a different balance in terms of 
accessibility, is the World Banana Forum (WBF) which was launched in 2009. Hosted 
by the FAO, the WBF represents a space where the main stakeholders of the global 
banana supply-chain work together to achieve consensus on best practices for 
sustainable production and trade.82 Since its inception it has held three conferences, the 
last of which was attended by over 300 delegates from 42 countries with participants 
representing a balance of players along the chain including small, medium and large-
scale growers organisations, unions, importers and exporters, retailers, civil society, 
scientists, research institutions, governments and inter-governmental organisations.83 
The most recent conference in Geneva included participatory workshops and working 
groups on issues such as the spread of Tropical Race 4 disease and gender equality.84 
The underlying ethos of the WBF is collaboration. It is partly member-funded through a 
fee which is tiered by organisation size and location, with the smallest members from 
least-developed countries paying the least (US$60) and very large companies paying the 
most (US$21,600). Moreover, all members are equally eligible to become part of the 
Steering Committee, to coordinate a Working Group, to be involved in the global 
change process and to access WBF information and contacts.  
 
The forum operates through two tiers of governance. A Steering Committee is 
composed of nominated representatives and coordinates the ongoing work of the forum 
and its Working Groups. Participation on the Committee is open to all (with the proviso 
that they have the time and willingness to commit). Above this is the Executive Board 
(made up of between 5 and 9 elected members) which is mandated to implement 
                                                     
81 HLPE, Multi-stakeholder Partnerships (Rome: High Level Panel of Experts, FAO, 2018). 
82 FAO, About the WBF, available at: {http://www.fao.org/world-banana-forum/about-the-forum/en/} accessed 25 
September 2018. 
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industry-cooperation} accessed 28 September 2018. 
84 Banana Link (2017). 
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decisions made by the Committee and represents the highest decision-making body. The 
Board rotates its members in order to maintain a balance in representation of the 
business sector (two persons), producers (one person), retailers (one person), trade 
unions (one person) and civil society organisations (two persons). WBF suggests that a 
balance of regional and gender representation is also taken into account. In order to 
focus discussion and break the forum into smaller groups, there are also three Working 
Groups that address different dimensions of sustainability: sustainable production 
systems and environmental impact; fairer distribution of value along the supply chain; 
and labour rights (including human rights, health and safety, gender equity and decent 
work).  
 
The WBF model, therefore, provides a global platform for deliberation on key issues 
facing the banana industry. It is also inclusive of a broad range of interested and 
affected parties, both large (such as Tesco) and small (such as WINFA, the Caribbean 
Windward Islands Farmers Association), and from all regions of the world. The quality 
of participation and inclusion is therefore potentially greatly improved in comparison to 
industry-led private commodity Roundtables.  
 
Of course, the WBF is not immune from criticism. It can legitimately be argued that it 
remains a form of elite deliberation that both excludes citizen participation and only 
offers opportunities of participation to those who are already integrated to such global 
networks in some way. Furthermore, the WBF has not yet found means by which to 
represent the interests of other affected parties, such as the animals whose habitats or 
migratory routes span banana plantations. Nonetheless, it does not require vast leaps of 
imagination to think how a similar model of deliberative practice  focused on food 
type  could become even more inclusive, by reaching out to and representing all 
affected parties.   
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3.4 The Question of Power 
 
One important issue remains: the question of power. In all of the real-world examples 
above, a central problem is not only in ensuring that affected parties participate, but that 
they can deliberate on equal terms: that their voices are heard, but also make a 
difference. If the democratisation of food is to take place not just in one community, but 
across local, national and regional borders, this raises challenges about the possibilities 
for equitable participation and deliberation. While a focus on food type might help to an 
extent, it cannot by itself resolve the problem. With such a broad range of perspectives 
and interests that need to be represented, how can we stop the powerful from 
dominating and enable those with less power to deliberate on an equal footing? This 
problem might be particularly acute for our model, since we are advocating for 
deliberative practices which also include the representatives of nonhuman animals  
perhaps the paradigm example of a voiceless marginalised group.  
 
In the citizen forum or mini-publics context, giving everyone the opportunity to make 
themselves heard has been found to be one of the major challenges.85 With this in mind, 
an increasing number of studies have started to examine the participatory quality of 
deliberation [emphasis added].86 Several strategies have been proposed. Smith argues 
that random sampling (as a way to ensure a diversity of viewpoints), provision of 
additional information and facilitation can be used to mitigate power.87  In particular, he 
finds that active facilitation plays an essential role in shaping and reshaping the 
conditions of free and equal deliberation, and that this makes a qualitative difference to 
the conditions under which deliberation takes place. Effective facilitation ensures that 
marginalised voices are heard by encouraging contributions from those who are less 
                                                     
85 Staffan Himmelroos, Discourse Quality in Deliberative Citizen Forums   A Comparison of Four Deliberative 
Mini-publics, Journal of Public Deliberation, 13:1 (2017). 
86 Himmelroos (2017). 
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predisposed to speak, ensuring that more politically able and charismatic voices do not 
dominate, and that democratic virtues such as mutual respect and reciprocity are 
encouraged.88 This can motivate delegates to consider the interests of their neighbours 
and to act in more solidarity with their needs, thereby transforming seemingly self-
interested motivations into ones orientated more towards the public good.89 For 
example, at a Participatory Budget forum in Chicago, a trained facilitator was able to 
create a shared space in which participants from opposing sides of a neighbourhood 
learnt about the problems facing the other and ranked the problems together, resulting in 
a shift in priorities towards those most in need, where before they had been 
overlooked.90 
 
Others have suggested that power is best mitigated when disempowered voices 
deliberate in their own enclaves.91 Karpowitz et al, for example, suggest the creation of 
homogenous groups of the least powerful. Membership of such groups can be structured 
by the sharing of similar viewpoints, structural locations (such as occupation), or 
identities. They suggest that the quality of deliberation and equity of deliberation in 
such groups has potential to be higher than in heterogenous groups as it allows groups 
to develop a stronger collective identity.92 It can give disempowered or marginalized 
groups an opportunity to develop their own unique perspectives and arguments, which 
might otherwise be overlooked or ignored.93 This type of deliberation is particularly 
common and valuable amongst community groups, civil society organisations and 
social movements. Of course, if members only speak to each other, this would decrease 
both the diversity of viewpoints and utility of the discussions. However, participants 
may oscillate between protected enclaves enabling them to test their ideas against the 
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reigning reality.94 Moreover, if enclave deliberation precedes wider deliberation, then 
it could play a valuable role in mitigating the power of dominant actors.95  
 
As Curato et al. argue, the simple fact is that deliberative democracy has an 
ambivalent and inextricable relationship with power. It offers opportunities for 
confronting coercive forms of power but also creates new forms of power of its 
own.96 Consequently, it is impossible to ever fully remove power from deliberative 
interactions or to completely overthrow structural and political constraints.97 Power 
instead is both integral and constitutive of deliberative democratic practices.98 
Deliberation is therefore vulnerable to coercive power and the domination of 
commercial and political interests, but at the same time integral to counteracting this by 
generating productive power.99 This means that as power shifts, the organisation of 
participation and deliberation needs to be continually reformulated. As Mansbridge 
argues, no democracy ever reaches the point where justice is done, therefore the 
ability to fight power lies in the proliferation of oppositional discourses and 
oppositional cultures.100 The more deliberative arenas there are, the greater chance of 
counteracting coercive power from a variety of different angles. 
 
While power imbalances are a difficulty for every decision mechanism, including 
deliberative ones, they do not constitute a reason to reject deliberative processes. 
Instead, they give us reason to find ways to mitigate such imbalances. As we have seen, 
there are a number of strategies which offer plausible and effective means to allow for 
marginalised, minority and other disempowered groups to participate on equal terms. 
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Such means are perfectly applicable to deliberative practices organised around food-
type. 
 
Section 4: Conclusion 
 
In order to tackle the multitude of competing ethical tensions in the global food system, 
we need a new approach that more effectively captures and balances competing 
interests than existing discourses. We argue that this is best achieved through 
deliberative democratic processes at the local, national, regional and global level. The 
papers motivating stance is that the approaches presently available  food security, 
food sovereignty, food justice and food democracy  while important and beneficial, are 
also  limited in significant ways. By analysing each in turn we have shown there to be a 
number of prerequisites for a new approach to global food governance, which includes 
the participation of all relevant affected parties, including sentient nonhuman animals. 
We propose that one way to balance these competing tensions is through a deliberative 
approach to the democratisation of food. This is because in order to change the status 
quo, we need a framework that allows all affected parties to have their say in a fashion 
that is regarded as legitimate by all relevant parties. Importantly, this process must 
provide opportunities for minority interests to win out, and for preferences to be both 
transformed and to be orientated towards the common good. Deliberative decision-
making is particularly suited to this challenge because it allows affected parties to hear 
from the experts, listen to the views of others, reflect on their own preferences and 
make an informed collective decision.  
 
By evaluating three approaches that cut and dice the scope and remit of deliberation in 
different ways, we argue that organising deliberation around food type is potentially 
more effective than deliberating about food holistically or by issue. Deliberating by 
food type, overcomes the need to generalise across different types of food and their 
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greatly varying markets. Additionally, if institutions are built around those who are 
directly involved in food chains, there is a higher likelihood of including those who are 
interested, affected and knowledgeable. The WBF, on paper, in particular embodies an 
archetype of an existing plausible deliberate forum that includes (nearly) the full gamut 
of affected parties along the supply chain, with equitable participation and governance 
structures, that puts significant weight on issues of social and global justice, is 
orientated towards the common good, and importantly emphasises collaboration as one 
of its key guiding principles.  
 
The contribution of this paper is therefore to bring a new procedural perspective to 
ongoing debates about the merits and limitations of current approaches to the global 
food system. Rather than arguing for food sovereignty over food security, or for food 
democracy over food justice, this paper, suggests that each of these approaches flags up 
important prerequisites to the development of a new approach for the global food 
system, that centres the deliberative democratisation of food. Key to this thesis is that 
the answer to the myriad challenges facing the global food system is procedural  in 
that it requires all affected parties to participate  and requires the reforming of 
institutional arrangements in order to support this.  
 
 
